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___________________________________________________________________________ 
NAOMI WALTHAM-SMITH 
 
FORM AND REPETITION: DELEUZE, GUILLAUME AND SONATA THEORY 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Repetition and Fate in Mozart’s Piano Concerto K. 491 
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati. That one wants 
nothing to be different, not forward, not backwards, not in all eternity. Not 
merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is 
mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary – but love it. (Nietzsche 
[1908] 1990, p. 258) 
If the first movement of Mozart’s second minor-mode piano concerto evokes a darker and 
even more ‘fatalistic’ (Hepokoski and Darcy 2006, p. 493) tone than the first, the soloist is 
arguably equally more determined to evade – or at least postpone – rather than embrace their 
fate.1 While Nietzsche saw an intimate connection between the return of the same and an 
amor fati that wills the future as much as the past, this movement also mobilises repetition as 
a means of deferral. Instead of conveying affirmation of what is, it uses repetition to suggest 
tension, even dread. Two different strands of repetition serve as instruments of deferral, both 
of which are used in the solo exposition to hold off the inevitable essential expositional 
closure (EEC) for as long as possible, postponing the future by revisiting the past. 
 
[INSERT EX. 1 NEARBY] 
 
One of this movement’s most distinctive strategies – absent from the other minor-mode 
concerto, K. 466 in D minor, although present in two major-mode concertos, K. 459 in F and 
K. 467 in C – consists in the reuse of its opening material as a recurring ideé fixe (Ex. 1). 
James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy observe that such a motto typically functions in Mozart’s 
concertos as a ‘rotationally inert […] wild card’ (2006, p. 482) that may be deployed at 
various junctures of the sonata structure without suggesting the reordering of material that 
would occur with an out-of-sequence reappearance of rotationally participatory material. 
Within this movement’s large-scale exposition space, embracing the first and second 
ritornellos together with the solo exposition they frame, the opening material (R1:\P) returns a 
total of six times. After an immediate restatement at the onset of the transition, the ideé fixe 
2 
 
returns to flesh out an expanded passage of caesura-fill between the production of the i:HC 
medial caesura in bar 34 and the onset of S ten bars later (Ex. 2). This caesura-fill is highly 
unusual both in its length and in its use of an ascending sequence, fashioned out of the tail of 
the ideé fixe and heard first in the oboe and then in the flute, which seems to contradict the 
idea of caesura-fill as ‘energy-loss’ (Hepokoski and Darcy 2006, p. 40). P also returns upon 
the attainment of the R1:\EEC at bar 62 with a terrifyingly ominous forte and upper-string 
tremolo to form the elided first theme in C-space (R1:\C1).  
 
[INSERT EX. 2 NEARBY] 
 
The expectations for the dynamic interplay between soloist and orchestra, individual 
and collective, determine how the solo exposition may be interpreted. The solo entry may 
either repeat the opening material of the ritornello, which can be taken as a sign of agreement, 
participation or acquiescence, or it can begin with entirely new material, suggesting the 
independence of striking out alone, even resisting or contradicting the massed forces. It is 
hence entirely in conformity with these norms that the solo entry here eschews the threatening 
ideé fixe in favour of a new, plaintive theme, which Hepokoski and Darcy hear as a sign of 
‘hesitant reluctance’ (p. 521) although the repeated notes might be heard to echo the 
reworking of the tail of the ideé fixe in the first ritornello’s caesura-fill. The tutti entry of the 
ideé fixe elided with the i:PAC at bar 118 recalls both R1:\P and the P-based R1:\TR as it 
merges without cadencing into the transition with the soloist’s re-entry at bar 124 (Ex. 3). 
Unlike the relatively unimpeded production of the R1:\EEC, in which R1:\S’s single 
compound sentence culminates in the i:PAC at bar 63, the solo exposition’s S-space is fraught 
with hesitations, rethinkings and diversions. The ideé fixe again returns, this time as one of a 
string of subordinate themes that serve to expand S-space and defer the S1:\EEC 
considerably: the III:PAC at bar 220 is immediately undermined by the sudden shift to the 
minor mode as the flute enters with a repetition of R1:\P material (Ex. 4). The ideé fixe also 
opens the elided R2 at bar 265, revisiting material from R1:\TR from bar 16 onwards. 
 
[INSERT EXS 3 AND 4 NEARBY] 
 
Beyond the exposition, in the half-rotational development, a tutti restatement of the 
motto at bar 302 provides the material for the ensuring sequential central action-zone. In a 
recapitulation with Type 2 features, the ideé fixe recurs at bar 362 with the orchestra re-
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entering with material from S1 (bars 118 onwards); it then reappears with the return at bar 
435 of the P-based caesura fill from bar 34 and at the onset of R4 at bar 473. Most striking is 
the final fifteen-bar coda, where the soloist, exceptionally retained throughout post-cadenza 
space, provides a rippling arpeggiated accompaniment to the orchestra’s fading ghostlike 
vestiges of the ideé fixe. 
The chief instrument of deferral in the solo exposition’s S-space, however, is not the 
characteristic ideé fixe, but a formulaic cadential progression. In other words, there are two 
intersecting processes of repetition-as-deferral in the larger exposition: one entails the return 
of material that is strongly identifiable as belonging to this particular piece, while the other 
brings back the epitome of convention. This duality will assume greater significance later, 
when both repetition and S-space are figured as processes of actualisation. The process is also 
dual in the sense that it involves juxtaposing a series of returns of an opening with a set of 
repeated endings. With the solo exposition’s privileging of the latter over the former, the 
effect is a large-scale shift from the repetition of particular openings towards the repeat of 
conventional endings as a means of EEC deferral. The repeated cadential formulas here fit 
into Hepokoski and Darcy’s category of ‘refrain cadences’ (2006, pp. 158–9 and 492): these 
involve the repetition of a certain ‘manner’ of cadences by recalling the harmonic and 
melodic ‘stamp’ of an earlier PAC. 
 
[INSERT EX. 5 NEARBY] 
 
A series of such cadences recalls the original cadential formula from the end of the 
soloist’s first subordinate theme at bars 155–156: a perfectly generic I–ii6–V<6/4><5/3>–I 
progression with a melodic <^>5–<^>4–<^>3–<^>2–<^>1 descent (Ex. 5). The immediate 
orchestral restatement of this S1:\S1 begins to conclude with this same formula but is diverted 
by a deceptive progression at bars 164–165. Further repetitions of the refrain cadence occur at 
bars 219–220 in the orchestra at the end of S1:\S2 (just before the return of the ideé fixe in 
E<f> minor), at the end of that harmonic diversion (S3) in bars 240–241 and at bars 248–249 
at the end of S4, which starts the display episode. The last recurrence comes in S5 as an 
evaded cadence in bars 256–257 just before a short expansion leading to the final trill-
cadence, which – at least on Hepokoski and Darcy’s reading – eventually produces the 
S1:\EEC at the last possible moment. The significant omissions and reorderings in the 
recapitulation’s compressed S-area (Fig. 1), which Hepokoski and Darcy hear as ‘a 
nightmarish irrationality’ (p. 595), lead to a much extended interval before the final 
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recapturing of the formula (even though the largest gap between refrain cadences is still the 
one in the exposition between bars 164–165 and 219–220). Refrain cadences conclude S3:\S2 
(bars 409–410 = bars 219–220) and S3:\S1 (bars 418–419 = bars 155–156) and its immediate 
orchestral restatement (bars 427–428 = bars 164–165), as well as, arguably, the reprise of 
R1:\S (bars 462–463 = bars 256–257). The recapitulation of K. 491,  more than the 
exposition, departs in its scope from Hepokoski and Darcy’s ‘paradigmatic instance’ of 
refrain cadences (the opening ritornello of the first movement of K. 413), where the 
reiterations come in rapid succession only a few bars apart (2006, pp. 158–9). Their analysis 
of K. 413 also sets a precedent, however, for stretching this concept over longer time spans in 
so far as they hear the very late repetition of the cadential figure at bars 171–172 within the 
concluding tutti of the solo exposition as a final recapture, extending S-space well beyond the 
trill cadence. I shall consider later how these expanded time spans affect our experience of 
these temporally separated cadences as a repetition of the same. 
 
[INSERT FIG. 1 NEARBY] 
 
This article is itself structured as a kind of ritornello, a series of refrain repetitions 
which revisit the same fundamental ideas from different angles. First, I show how the debate 
between William Caplin on one side and James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy on the other – 
which manifests itself not only in a dispute over the location of the EEC but also in the 
contested primacy of formal function over type – derives from two different constructions of 
temporality. I demonstrate, however, that this is not simply a question of temporal ordering or 
vantage point but ultimately comes down to two opposed ontologies of potentiality, to two 
different conceptions of the way in which possibility exists in music. Put differently, the 
contrasting temporal images that each theory yields derive from competing visions of how the 
modal categories of possibility, impossibility, contingency and necessity are experienced in 
music. 
The second section revisits this theme of potentiality from a philosophical perspective, 
elaborating how its different modalities are mobilised in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
notion of the musical refrain. My interpretation of this concept follows Peter Hallward’s 
reading of Deleuze (2006) as first and foremost a thinker of virtuality, whose thought is 
motivated by the fundamental equation of being and creation. This emphasis allows me to 
forge a connection between Deleuze and both Guillaume and recent Italian proponents of the 
modality of (im)potentiality. Although the virtual appears as a recurrent motif in recent 
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engagements with Deleuze within music studies (see, for example, Hulse and Nesbitt 2010), 
the musical ramifications of this distinctive modality as an experience of radical contingency, 
especially for our understanding of form, have not received any sustained or rigorous 
exploration. One temptation, given the sheer terminological proliferation in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s oeuvre, has been to seek a music-theoretical application for individual 
philosophical concepts (say, ‘speed’ or ‘rhizome’) rather than to transform analytical practice 
according to the singular impulse which underpins each of the terminological creations. Even 
when the need to do so is recognised, the truly radical nature of the virtual, which demands 
that it be thought subtracted from all actuality, is often overlooked in proposals that analysis 
‘map the virtual in relation to the actual’ (Hulse 2010, p. 37) or that ‘we orient ourselves 
toward the potentialities yet unrealized’ (Gallope 2010, p. 80). 
The full significance of the constitution of the virtual for a theory of musical repetition 
comes to light only once Deleuze and Guattari’s brief allusion to Gustave Guillaume’s work 
on verb forms is unpacked (2004, p. 330). Little known outside French linguistic and 
philosophical circles, Guillaume’s work is distinguished by a critique of his own Saussurian 
heritage, in which he reconceives of the relation of langue to parole as one of potential to 
actual. That his theories have been of interest to thinkers of virtuality and potentiality, 
including Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben (2005b, pp. 65–8), is therefore unsurprising; 
Deleuze has also embraced him as a thinker of difference (2004, p. 256).2 Guillaume’s theory 
of the temporality of the verb’s construction provides a concrete path towards developing a 
more sophisticated model of the various images of time produced in the unfolding of musical 
form. 
The final section returns to the exposition of the first movement of K. 491, now fusing 
this linguistic-philosophical theory of potentiality with the latest developments in musical 
Formenlehre to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the refrain cadence’s 
role in the experience of temporality and potentiality. The refrain cadence, with its repetition 
of a stock formula, is an especially fascinating music-theoretical concept because, more than 
other means of EEC deferral, its process of temporal reopening intersects with the dialogic 
negotiation of convention and idiosyncrasy. To demonstrate this, I deepen Michael Spitzer’s 
notion of cadential liquidation via the nexus of Guillaumian and Deleuzian thought which I 
develop, explicitly recasting Spitzer’s opposition of convention and thematic particularity as 
an actualisation of potentiality, much like Guillaume’s reframing of Saussure. This leads not 
only to a reconfigured way of thinking about liquidation, but also to a reappraisal of what is 
fundamentally at stake in recent debates over musical form and a reconfiguration of the 
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different positions within this field. Ultimately, I argue that the issues presented by K. 491’s 
refrain cadences call for a theory of musical form filtered through the prism of potentiality. 
 
Time and Repetition; or, Which PAC? 
My attention focuses on the larger exposition in so far as I am concerned with strategies of 
EEC deferral and their relation to processes of repetition – and with the representations of 
temporality that they construct. This focus also enables me to revisit the Caplin–versus–
Hepokoski and Darcy debate: by default, which cadence in the new key produces the EEC? 
Whichever way one answers, the question demands an investigation of the various strategies 
by which S-space is expanded, such as those cited in the analysis of the first movement of K. 
491 above. But whether one thinks of these as reopening what was done in the past or as 
postponing what will inevitably come in the future determines the representation of time that 
S-space produces and, with it, a stance towards necessity. It makes all the difference between 
Nietzschean greatness and the resentment to which amor fati is opposed. 
This formal juncture is also ripe for a deconstructive reading of musical temporality, 
because different constructions of the temporal present are manifestations of different 
modalities of self-presence.3 The EEC generates a play of identity (sameness) and difference 
in sonata form: unlike the corresponding moment in the recapitulation, where the tonic returns 
to itself, the EEC strives to make the other self-present. The rhyming cadence in the 
recapitulation strives to close over the margin of alterity, but this fundamental difference is 
registered structurally in the fact that neither the exposition nor the recapitulation can achieve 
closure in the now of the present. Caplin’s music-theoretical distinction between cadential 
arrival and cadential function tries to account for this impossibility.4 He distinguishes between 
a point at which the cadential dominant resolves to the tonic and a larger time span over 
which the various conditions for thematic closure (broadly construed as an assemblage of 
harmonic, melodic, rhythmic and textural properties) are fulfilled. Caplin then builds on this 
distinction in order to question whether high-level formal closure ought to be conceptualised 
as cadential, as is typically done in music theory. Taking the example of the subordinate 
theme, he argues that, while the points of arrival may coincide, the time span over which 
closure is attained is vastly different at the higher level of the exposition than at the level of 
the phrase: the process of attaining expositional closure takes much more time than the local 
cadential progression by which thematic closure is achieved. 
This difference is what motivates Caplin’s insistence that the EEC come only at the end 
of the subordinate theme or set of multiple themes. By contrast, Hepokoski and Darcy, who 
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follow William Rothstein’s position on this point (2006, pp. 120–4), propose that, by default, 
‘the first satisfactory PAC that goes on to differing material’ (p. 18) is to be considered the 
EEC. Caplin’s dissent from this view rests upon his position that formal hierarchies are not 
necessarily uniform and continuous in the way that grouping or metrical hierarchies may be 
(2004, p. 65). Formal closure may take place in different ways at different levels – and not 
necessarily in the manner of the local cadential harmonic progression. This is why the first 
PAC cannot constitute the EEC: no local point of cadential arrival – no PAC – can close the 
whole exposition. Technically, the last PAC does not effect this closure either. Only the larger 
process that takes place over the span of the whole subordinate-theme group can achieve this 
higher-order closure. 
What is of greatest interest here, though, is not that Caplin assigns the task of 
expositional closure to this larger time span, but that, in dissolving the point into a time span, 
he invokes a certain temporality of listening: 
I would suggest that the process of creating expositional closure occurs within 
the time-span of the entire subordinate theme, for even when that theme 
begins, we can hear ahead […] to the eventual end of the exposition and 
already experience that the exposition is in the process of closing. (2004, p. 
81; emphasis added) 
Surely the same could be said at the level of the theme? Even if the time spans and internal 
organisations of the stretches of music in question are sufficiently different as to warrant 
labelling them separately as cadential and subordinate-theme functions, the projective 
listening disposition is a distinctive feature of Caplin’s conception of musical closure in 
general, irrespective of hierarchical level. It is this attention to time spans rather than points 
that enables Caplin to cast himself as a thinker of temporally inflected function, in opposition 
to Hepokoski and Darcy’s preoccupation with static types.5 Even if this opposition is 
undoubtedly overdrawn, Spitzer’s more nuanced reconfiguration of this dualism has some 
explanatory power. Drawing upon the distinction that eighteenth-century theorist Heinrich 
Christian Koch makes between the rhetorical articulations with which the ends of phrases are 
marked and the structural grouping by which time spans are assembled together conceptually 
from the standpoint of the first Taktteil (Spitzer 2004, p. 248), he proposes that Hepokoski 
and Darcy are theorists of punctuation, while Caplin is an advocate of rhythmic grouping 
(Spitzer 2007, p. 154). Extrapolating from this opposition, Caplin would privilege beginnings 
over Hepokoski and Darcy’s endings, first groups which tense away from their openings over 
second groups which relax towards their closes (and to which Hepokoski and Darcy devote 
more attention) and, finally, the diachrony of moment-to-moment rhythm over the synchronic 
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perspective afforded by punctuation’s hierarchy of degrees of cadential closure. In other 
words, Caplin would privilege temporal unfolding over Hepokoski and Darcy’s spatialisation. 
The straightforward opposition of time and space, though, does not give sufficient credit 
to either side of the debate. In fact, Caplin’s focus on function invites music theory to think of 
temporality not as uniform, but as inflected into different constructions of time. His own 
division of time into beginning, middle and end risks being too simplistic to account for the 
varied and dynamic ways in which music constructs and reconstructs images of time as it 
unfolds. At worst, this tripartite division is in danger of reinstating the spatialisation of which 
he accuses Hepokoski and Darcy, to the extent that it categorises temporal functions 
according to their position relative to other functions (‘we can hear ahead’). Despite Caplin’s 
plea that the subordinate-theme group be heard as ‘in the process of closing’, his theory tends 
all too readily towards representations of time as if they were already completed. By contrast, 
it is actually Hepokoski and Darcy’s model of EEC deferral through PAC reopenings that 
presents a richer account of temporal representations in so far as it examines them in the 
process not only of their completion, but also of their unravelling and incompletion. 
Hepokoski and Darcy ask whether retrospectively reopening a PAC might be 
conceptualised as ‘turning back the sonata clock’ (2006, p. 157). Although they shy away 
from considering the full ramifications of this position, they note in passing that it would 
entail a dislocation between the time of the work’s unfolding and the onslaught of external 
clock time. It is, of course, possible to slide this caesura in the direction of listening to create a 
separation between the time of music’s unfolding and the representation of time produced by 
the ear – and, even further, to form a cut within listening itself between its completed 
representation and the time it takes to produce such a representation. Hepokoski and Darcy do 
not even begin to approach these issues, but their idea that musical time might be elastic and 
even reversible, when understood in its full force, is sufficiently provocative. 
The difference between Caplin’s waiting for the last PAC, on the one hand, and 
Hepokoski and Darcy’s undoing of the first PAC, on the other, at times seems to coalesce in 
practice, but an analysis of how these issues play out in the first movement of K. 491 shows 
that the distinction is worth maintaining. By waiting for the last PAC at the end of the 
subordinate-theme group, the EEC can only be experienced as such in hindsight. In K. 491 
this would mean waiting through all the various subordinate themes, expansions and 
diversions, wondering with each refrain cadence: ‘might this be it?’ Even with the second 
trill-cadence at bars 263–265, there cannot be a decision on the EEC until there is certainty 
that the second orchestral ritornello is underway; given that R1:\P appears as a rotationally 
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inert ideé fixe throughout the movement, this may not immediately be the case, even if it is 
very likely. Only then can it be said: ‘that was it!’ The interesting aspect of this model is that 
it does not permit the experience of closure as it is being completed, but only as something 
that will be completed or has been completed. There is a disconcerting voiding of the ‘now’: 
the moment at which a possibility of completion is actualised is rendered inaccessible to 
experience. The logical conclusion of Caplin’s commitment to the last PAC has an 
unexpectedly deconstructive twist: there can be no experience of a present, but only of a 
minimal out-of-jointedness. 
It would be wrong to imagine, however, that Caplin’s subordinate-theme group is an 
undifferentiated span of waiting. Even if the moment of crystallisation is ‘missed’, Caplin’s 
model of how this process of closure takes shape is finely granulated. The sense of movement 
towards closure is indicated not simply through the presence of cadences or their relative 
strength, but through a whole nexus of parameters which locates a theme on a continuum 
between tight-knit and loose. Tight-knit themes are characterised by stable tonality and 
harmonic function, strong cadential closure and symmetrical groupings, while looser 
constructions tend to exhibit more modulation, functionally unstable harmonies, asymmetrical 
groupings, functional ambiguity and motivic diversity. Thematic constructions also exhibit a 
progression from tight-knit to loose, moving from the most conventional and functionally 
efficient (first periods, then sentences followed by hybrids) to idiosyncratic designs with more 
redundancies in the form of repetitions, expansions, extensions and interpolations. Although 
Caplin concedes that it may not be possible in some situations to characterise each of the 
group’s constitutive themes as more or less loose, a theme’s location on the spectrum from 
tight-knit to loose may be considered roughly indicative of the degree of expositional closure 
attained; specifically, the first is often the most tight-knit (1998, p. 121). As counter-intuitive 
as it may at first seem, looser constructions are further along a progression towards higher-
level closure because their relative instability provides a greater motivation for closure and 
hence makes it seem more imminent.  
The solo exposition’s subordinate-theme group in K. 491 provides examples of a 
number of the typical loosening techniques, the effect of which is to contour the approach 
towards expositional closure.6 The first theme (Ex. 6) in the piano (bars 148–156) is notably 
tight-knit: it proceeds according to a fairly straightforward sentence construction with the 
basic idea in bars 148–149, culminating in a III:PAC after an internal expansion of the 
continuation function through the repetition in bars 153–154. By comparison, the immediate 
orchestral restatement is loosened by a deceptive cadence at bar 165 and then gives way to a 
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significant expansion, beginning with a series of continuation phrases characterised by model-
sequence technique. The first descending-fifths progression, which undergoes a change in 
root with every bar, switches to three bars of descending thirds before it resumes with the 
harmonic rhythm expanded to one change every four bars with repetitions of the melodic 
figure; an accelerated ascending-second sequence sets up a complete perfect authentic 
cadence, which wears its trill as a badge of closure, only for the group to open out onto 
another theme. As if to play along by suggesting the onset of a closing zone, the theme at bar 
201 is more harmonically stable; a half cadence at bars 209–210, followed by a repetition of 
the first half culminating in the refrain cadence PAC at bars 219–220, suggests an overall 
periodic structure. 
 
[INSERT EX. 6 NEARBY] 
 
The sudden modal shift at bar 221, however, presents an even more dramatic loosening 
strategy and precipitates increasing harmonic instability with a chromatic descending bass 
line supporting diminished-seventh harmonies leading to the repeat of the refrain cadence. 
This point of greatest loosening heightens the sense of imminent expositional closure: it gives 
way to a display episode which, in keeping with the virtuosic habitus of the passage, is 
loosely constructed; the theme is first extended through an evaded cadence in bars 256–257 
before it produces an expanded cadential progression (another loosening device), complete 
with the movement’s second trill-cadence, in bars 257–265 (Ex. 7). Caplin’s perspective 
therefore allows one to see how expositional closure is attained not at a single point of arrival, 
but through a process of completion which unfolds through the ordering and combination of 
various loosening techniques. The course taken in bringing the exposition to its end is not a 
uniform approach to the cadence, but a trajectory contoured by the relative intensity and 
pacing of its loosening strategies.  
 
[INSERT EX. 7 NEARBY] 
 
If Caplin’s approach views closure as gradually achieved through the loosening of 
thematic construction, Hepokoski and Darcy’s model, by contrast, foregrounds the way in 
which closure, already achieved through a local cadential progression, may subsequently be 
undone. From their perspective, a decision in favour of expositional closure comes 
immediately with the III:PAC in bars 155–156 at the end of the soloist’s first compound 
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sentence in the new key: ‘this is it!’ This assertion, though, will be contested, only to be 
replaced by that of another potential EEC, and this process of overturning will be repeated 
time and time again over the course of the remainder of the solo exposition. In many cases it 
is repetition that is instrumental in undoing this sense of closure, and, in contrast to the idea 
(derided by Caplin) that PACs in C-space provide further affirmation of closure, there are 
various kinds of repetition which tend instead to elicit uncertainty. The immediate orchestral 
expanded repetition of S1:\S1 is a classic example of a PAC reopening which has the 
retroactive effect of deactivating the higher-level closure of the first PAC. In other words, it is 
a matter of downgrading an earlier PAC’s structural significance, whereas Caplin sees the 
cumulative effect of loosening strategies as effectively upgrading the structural force of a 
future PAC because of the increase in cadential imminence. Hepokoski and Darcy instead 
view the various sequential expansions, together with the deceptive and evaded cadences, as 
having a primarily backwards-looking effect. 
It is the refrain cadences discussed earlier (a strategy which Caplin does not discuss) 
that seem to be most instrumental in undoing the closure effects of previous PACs: in 
recapturing the ending of a previous S module, they retrospectively weaken the capacity of 
that cadential stamp to effect closure in so far as it is shown to have been inadequate. With 
this ‘backing-up […] and recovery’ (Hepokoski and Darcy 2006, p. 492), there is also the 
sense of a persistent attachment to the cadential figure, which, following the requirement that 
the EEC move on the differing material, must be ‘relinquished’ (p. 158) before it is possible 
to move onward into C-space. 
The analytical observations generated by both systems tend in practice to converge, but 
it is important to stress that a vital gap prevents their coinciding. Whereas for Caplin what 
might be resolves into what was, for Hepokoski and Darcy what is dissolves into what might 
have been. The choice of a concerto as the main analytical example for discussing these issues 
stems from its melding of ritornello and sonata procedures. By definition, ritornello manifests 
a paratactic, chainlike construction, in contrast to the synchronic conception produced by 
sonata form. Like variation, it proceeds through a repetition of likenesses. Furthermore, this is 
arguably a better translation of Nietzsche’s ‘ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’: gleich may be 
decomposed into the prefix ge-, signifying being together with (commonly thought to equate 
to the Latin cum), and -leich, deriving from the proto-Germanic lig, which is equivalent to the 
proto-Indo-European līk, whence the English ‘likeness’. This suggests that what returns in 
Nietzsche’s experiment is actually what is like, but nonetheless not quite the same. In line 
with what Catherine Malabou (2010, p. 21) has described as an ‘interpretative coup’ whereby 
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twentieth-century French thought has turned Nietzsche into ‘the first and foremost thinker of 
difference’, one might say that the only identical thing that returns is the differential margin 
that separates one likeness and the next. 
The refrain cadences may be understood in a similar way: not as the increasing 
imminence of fate, but as Deleuze’s ‘repetition of difference’ (1983, p. 46). This analysis may 
be furthered by considering Jacques Derrida’s reading of the eternal return as the 
deconstruction of auto-affection: the self turns back on itself but in doing so returns to itself 
as other-than-itself. The eternal return may be likened to the anniversary: ‘the moment when 
the year turns back on itself, forms a ring or annulus with itself, annuls itself and begins 
anew’ (1988, p. 11; emphasis in original). This is the effect of the refrain cadence: it returns to 
itself to annul its closure effect and begin again. 
 
The Time of the Refrain 
Let us then begin again – not with Mozart or sonata theory, not with the refrain cadence, but 
with Deleuze’s refrain. The refrain, Deleuze and Guattari assert, is ‘properly musical content, 
the block of content proper to music’ (2004, p. 330), but music exists in an antagonistic 
relation to its proper material. The refrain is not the ‘origin’ of music, but ‘a means of 
preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it’ (p. 331). If the refrain is an obstacle to music, 
it is equally impossible that music exist without the refrain. The refrain is music’s condition 
of possibility: ‘music exists because the refrain exists also, because music takes up the refrain 
[…] it forms a block with it in order to take it somewhere else’ (p. 331). It is this sense of at 
once taking up and taking elsewhere that Hepokoski and Darcy – intuitively, perhaps, and 
without awareness of its full Deleuzian ramifications – capture in their notion of the refrain 
cadence as the reopening of closure. Deleuze and Guattari expressly mention Mozart’s 
variation procedure when they discuss how music operates on the refrain: ‘Mozart’s refrains. 
A theme in C, followed by twelve variations; not only is each note of the theme doubled, but 
the theme is doubled internally. Music submits the refrain to this very special treatment of the 
diagonal or transversal, it uproots the refrain from its territoriality’ (p. 331).7 One can only 
imagine what Deleuze and Guattari might have said had they appreciated, beyond techniques 
of rhythmic acceleration and formal expansion, the full sophistication of Mozart’s variation 
procedures. Their description of music does, however, capture the two-pronged impetus of 
variation: its production of difference in the repetition of the same. Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest moreover that music is traversed by the double movement: ‘[w]hereas the refrain is 
essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritorializing’, music is ‘a creative, active 
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operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain’ (p. 331). The 
territorialisation/deterritorialisation pair is a form of articulating the fundamental opposition 
of identity to difference and one which captures nicely the issues of spatialisation in 
representations of musical temporality. If the refrain organises heterogeneous bodies into the 
consistent unity of assemblages, music’s task, according to Deleuze and Guattari, consists in a 
loosening or unravelling – an escape from the organising impulse of the refrain towards the 
instability of the outside. Music is thus defined as something which always already moves 
outside of its own propriety (the refrain) and differs from itself. 
This differentiation, however, is not to be collapsed into a ‘negation’ of the refrain but 
should be thought as ‘essentially positive and creative’ (Deleuze 1991, p. 103). Music in its 
deterritorialising impulse is a manifestation of the inexhaustible creativity that all being is. 
Deleuze’s reconfiguration of ontology entails a shift in the conception of being from creature 
to creatings, that is, a move away from the actual concrete individuality in which being is 
realised towards the bottomless well of possible virtual creatings that may or may not be 
actualised. At the risk of oversimplification, actual creatures are static, fixed and determined. 
Against actuality Deleuze values a philosophical gesture of counter-actualisation and 
indetermination which effects a line of flight (music’s diagonal) towards a purely virtual 
creating. To deterritorialise the refrain means to return it from actual to virtual: music’s task, 
against the refrain’s relentless drive towards actualisation, is to restore the refrain to its 
originary condition of possibility. Music converts what is into what might or might not be. 
Deleuze and Guattari also make, beyond this claim for music’s repotentialising 
capacity, a seemingly enigmatic assertion about the refrain: ‘The refrain fabricates time [du 
temps]. The refrain is the “implied tense” [temps impliqué] discussed by the linguist Gustave 
Guillaume […]. Here, Time is not an a priori form; rather the refrain […] fabricates different 
times’ (2004, pp. 384–5). 
Over the course of the passage between the repetitions of this refrain (‘the refrain 
fabricates time […] the refrain […] fabricates different times’), music’s deterritorialisation is 
entrusted to the listener: ‘a state of force on the part of the listener’ through which the refrain 
‘turns back on itself, opens onto itself, revealing until then unheard-of potentialities, entering 
into other connections, setting [itself] adrift in the direction of other assemblages’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004, p. 349). And yet what kind of listening is this that restores music to its 
potentiality? Perhaps it is the kind that allows one to ‘turn back the sonata clock’ and permits 
a cadence to turn back on itself and restore to itself the potentiality to move off in other 
directions and form new S-modules. 
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The reference to Guillaume is elliptical, and yet, upon careful investigation, it reveals 
something further about the representations of time produced by such a listening. That is, it 
enables one to define more closely the gap that separates the two images of time produced by 
Caplin’s theory on the one hand and Hepokoski and Darcy’s on the other – and, moreover, to 
propose a refinement of these theories. Why Guillaume’s work should hold such a fascination 
for Deleuze and Guattari becomes evident when once one realises that the concept of temps 
impliqué is part of a larger project attempting to think potentiality (virtuality) within 
language. Guillaume inherits from Saussurian linguistics a conception of language as a 
twofold entity made up of actual observable utterances (parole) and the broader dimension of 
language out of which speech is actualised (langue). What is distinctive about Guillaume’s 
theory is the way in which it seeks to realise the implications of Saussure’s insights by 
rethinking this second dimension of language in its potentiality. Unlike the post-Saussurian 
conception of langue as an inventory of possible, but as yet unspoken, utterances, Guillaume 
thinks of language-as-potentiality as a system which provides the potential for carrying out 
certain processes that enable us to form words. This reconfigured langue (typically translated 
as ‘tongue’ to show the distance from Saussure) (Hirtle 2007, p. 8) consists not in an abstract 
norm, but in a potential in the mind of a speaker, specifically in a grammatical system whose 
potentialities are actualised through mental operations so as to form actual utterances. 
The concept of temps impliqué assumes its place within this conception of language-as-
potentiality in one of Guillaume’s most significant projects: a theory of the formation of the 
verb (1929). Guillaume understands the system of the verb as a means of producing a 
representation of time. A series of mental operations, conceived of as subsystems of the verb, 
actualises the potential that exists in tongue in order to form this ‘time image’ – a process that 
Guillaume calls ‘chronogenesis’ (p. 10). Chronogenesis decomposes into three stages, each of 
which produces a distinct representation of time or ‘chronothesis’. It is only with the third and 
most complete time image that the process of completing the representation is complete. To 
this extent, Guillaume’s model of chronogenesis may provide a useful tool for thinking about 
the way in which closure is produced as a process across the entire subordinate-theme group. 
It is especially useful in so far as it suggests a way of characterising the relative consistency 
of each of the stages in this process and thus offers a model for mapping Caplin’s distinction 
between tight-knit and loose onto the process by which closure is brought to completion. In 
1929, when Guillaume published his breakthrough volume Temps et verbe, his theory was 
unusual in that it sought to integrate fully the systems of mood, aspect and tense into his 
conception of the verb. This yields one of the most fascinating aspects of his thought for a 
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theory of musical temporality: the correspondences Guillaume draws between the stages of 
the chronogenesis and the different subsystems of aspect, mood and tense. 
Guillaume’s theory performs two operations on this triad of subsystems. Thinking of 
the three subsystems as points on the vertical axis, the first, relatively straightforward, 
operation consists in charting the succession of verbal moods along the horizontal temporal 
axis to reflect the process of completion of the time image. The second operation involves 
folding the three subsystems back within the horizon of mood so as to correlate each 
subsystem with each of the moods forming the chronogenesis. Chronogenesis thus progresses 
along the horizontal axis through three different moods, so that the quasi-nominal mood, 
comprised of infinitives and participles, forms the first chronothesis and the subjunctive forms 
the second representation; only with the indicative, at the end, is a complete time image 
constructed. The progression from quasi-nominal to indicative gives rise to three different 
ways of representing time. This aspect of Guillaume’s theory could usefully model the way in 
which listening produces different temporal representations over the course of the second 
group’s unfolding. 
Mood, however, produces only one component of the time image, representing what 
linguists call ‘universe time’, that is, the infinite horizon of time in which events take place. It 
is, as it were, time as a container or a priori construction in which event time takes place, and 
thus approximates the naive conception of form rejected by modern music theory, in no small 
part because it leaves little room for interaction with the listener. Mood nonetheless provides 
an essential basis for more sophisticated representations of time. Each mood presents a 
different representation of universe time (Fig. 2). Working backwards from the most readily 
grasped, the indicative mood (e.g. ‘he goes’, ‘we went’) presents universe time as an infinite 
stretch divided by the present, conceived as a durationless limit between past and non-past 
which coincides with the act of speech. As in the indicative, forms of the verb in the 
subjunctive mood (e.g. ‘were I going’, ‘lest she go’) are capable of predicating their event of a 
subject; in the subjunctive, however, the verb is not limited to locating the event with 
reference to the present but can situate it anywhere within the whole horizon of time. 
Moreover, because the event cannot be situated at a point in the past or the non-past as a 
reality, it is represented as a possibility; but, in so far as the subject is able to appropriate and 
bring this possibility into reality at some future moment, the subjunctive likewise gives rise to 
a future-oriented conception of universe time. Finally, the quasi-nominal mood comprises the 
non-finite forms: infinitives (e.g. ‘to go’, ‘to have been going’) and participles (e.g. ‘going’, 
‘gone’). It also produces an undivided stretch of time but, unlike the subjunctive, quasi-
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nominal forms cannot fall incident to a subject without the aid of an auxiliary (for example, 
by adding ‘have’ to a participle in English). This leads to a past-oriented representation of 
time, a conception of time as something that happens to us and passes us by rather than as 
something that can be seized. 
 
[INSERT FIG. 2 NEARBY] 
 
The other two subsystems of the verb flesh out the representation of time within the 
horizon determined by mood. If mood concerns the time in which event time is contained, the 
other two subsystems concern the stretch of time during which the event itself takes place: 
they produce the time which is contained within universe time. Guillaume discerns two 
distinct components of event time, which refer respectively to its external and internal 
dimensions. First, the distinction between different verbal tenses takes place within the 
outward-oriented dimension of temps expliqué. In other words, a difference in tense is the 
product of a difference in event time’s relation to the time outside. Tense thus serves to locate 
event time within universe time. By contrast, Guillaume uses the term temps impliqué (recall 
that this was Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the refrain) to describe the relation of event 
time to itself. The concept of temps impliqué is thus an index of time’s internal consistency. 
This thinking gives clarity to the concept of aspect by proposing that the degree to which an 
event is actualised be thought of as its relation to its own unfolding. Guillaume’s concept of 
temps impliqué thereby thinks the actualisation of a potentiality as a form of self-relation, as a 
progression through degrees of self-identity. The concept of temps impliqué thus offers one 
way of thinking of the ways in which expositional and later recapitulatory closure is produced 
as self-presence over course of the second group. 
From this account it is possible to comprehend why Guillaume’s temps impliqué is a 
model for Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the refrain as (re)territorialisation. The refrain 
is a process of actualisation or, perhaps better yet, a measure or index of its own degree of 
actualisation. To fully understand what is at stake in the notion of temps impliqué, however, it 
will be necessary to bring into play Guillaume’s secondary manoeuvre, whereby he maps the 
different subsystems of the verb onto the different moods. While Guillaume claims that aspect 
is a function of temps impliqué, he also argues that this differentiation of aspect occurs from 
within the perspective of the quasi-nominal mood. Consider how tense (temps expliqué) as 
such is unable to emerge as a separate category within the horizon of the quasi-nominal mood. 
At this point, only aspect (temps impliqué) can be formed, because event time cannot have an 
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external referent in universe time. Verbal tenses in the quasi-nominal mood represent not the 
position of event time within universe time, but the different degrees of actualisation of the 
event. The infinitive, as in ‘there’s a long time to go’, represents the yet-to-be-actualised 
potential, the present participle, ‘going’, is caught in the midst of the process of actualising, 
and the past participle indicates the already actualised. 
The correspondence Guillaume draws between each subsystem and mood means that, as 
one goes through the process of chronogenesis, one travels the path of actualisation. Working 
backwards in a line of flight towards the purely virtual, tense fixes event time in relation to 
the present, so that in the indicative mood it is fully actualised. Before this, mood provides the 
representation of time in which the event may take place at some unspecified point. This kind 
of potentiality, however, is what Deleuze dismisses as the merely possible as opposed to the 
virtual. As Hallward explains in his astute commentary on Deleuze’s concept of the virtual, 
to realise a possibility is to bring something efficiently pre-existent into 
existence […] . The realisation of a possibility will resemble the pre-existent 
possibility itself; realisation of the possible is thus simply an aspect of 
actuality. Virtual differentiation, by contrast, creates the very thing that it 
actualises. (2006, pp. 36–7) 
Guillaume’s conception of a subsystem which needs to be actualised prior to the 
subjunctive mood is an attempt to think precisely such a virtual differentiation. Before the 
first stage of chronogenesis is complete, there simply is no concrete possibility which could 
be realised. Up until that point, the event does not exist as an actual potentiality, but only as a 
potential potentiality whose form is yet to be determined. Rather, it is the transformation in 
temps impliqué still within the framework of the quasi-nominal mood which creates a genuine 
potentiality in the first place, rather than a mere possibility-in-waiting. It is only because the 
event also has its own temps impliqué and can thereby mark the extent of its own 
actualisation, that it becomes possible to speak of a truly virtual differentiation and of the 
coming into existence of a potentiality as such. Without the first stage of chronogenesis, there 
would simply be a progression from an actual potentiality (that is, a fully formed, consistent 
possibility-in-waiting) to an actual actualisation. There would be merely an actualisation of 
the actual. It is only because temps impliqué allows one to discern, before any actuality, a 
truly potential potentiality (that is, a contingency which may or may not pass into actuality) 
that there is an actualisation of the virtual. 
 
The Actualisation of Cadential Closure 
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What, then, would a sonata theory reconfigured along the lines of Guillaume’s notion of 
chronogenesis look like? One model that moves in this direction is the alternative conception 
of the sonata exposition proposed by Spitzer (2008, pp. 189–229). His theory has the 
advantage of partially reconciling the opposition between Caplin’s rhythmic model and 
Hepokoski and Darcy’s orientation towards endings: both the first PAC and the last of the 
second group may be considered as significant structural goals, with the qualification that 
they are the goals of two different processes. Spitzer’s model of the exposition is thus marked 
by a double traversal. Drawing upon Caplin’s Schoenbergian analysis of sentence 
construction, Spitzer proposes hearing two processes of ‘liquidation’ that intersect at the first 
theme of the second group. The first PAC becomes the goal of a large-scale ‘thematic 
liquidation’ which runs over from the transition and whose task is to ‘realise’ the material of 
the first group. The last PAC, by comparison, is reconfigured as the goal of a second process 
of ‘cadential liquidation’, in which the final foreground PAC gradually emerges out of more 
middleground tonal models built from the same grammatical functions, by analogy with the 
way in which a sentential liquidation realises thematic material. The first, thematic liquidation 
is an actualisation in the sense that it realises a potential which is latent in the opening 
material, but which remains at that point transparent in so far as it is integrated seamlessly 
into the syntax. The actualisation takes place through a ‘functional flip’, in which formulaic 
convention is realised as a particular motivic detail, thereby rendering it perceptible as such 
(2008, p. 194). To this extent, thematic liquidation is the actualisation of something that may 
or may not be heard as such. 
The second, cadential liquidation takes up the fruits of this thematic liquidation to 
initiate a new process driven by variational, paratactic logic, rather than that of thematic 
development.8 In this way Spitzer fully acknowledges the pattern of repetition characteristic 
of Mozart’s second groups. However, rather than this repetition’s forming a hierarchy of 
cadential closure, it allows the final foreground cadence to bubble up and be distilled out of 
larger-scale middleground progressions. In this way ‘the dispute about whether or not the 
second group is an expanded cadence […] admits of a new solution. The functional burden of 
the group begins as thematic but “modulates” to the cadential’ (2008, p. 198). This alternative 
model also overcomes the difficulty of how to construe postcadential V–I progressions: just 
as the transition’s process of thematic liquidation runs on into the first subordinate theme, the 
second group’s cadential liquidation overruns the EEC into C-space. The idea of cadential 
liquidation also responds to Caplin’s concerns about reducing expositional closure to a point 
of arrival, not simply by expanding the time span under consideration, but also by thinking of 
19 
 
the process of expositional closure according to a depth model whereby there is an 
‘emergence’ of, rather than a kinetic approach towards, the cadence. 
Cadential liquidation is thus also figured as a process of actualisation in which the latent 
possibilities of the first subordinate theme are converted into a local foreground cadential 
progression. There is, I suggest, a tension here, not simply in Mozart’s music but in Spitzer’s 
theoretical model. Spitzer thinks of liquidation as a realisation of the particular (motivic 
detail) out of the universal (conventional formula). Even if the local cadence emerges from 
middleground progressions, on a larger view he hears the final formulaic cadential 
progression as realising an inconspicuous motivic detail, say an accompaniment figure, in the 
first subordinate theme. This process of cadential liquidation thus involves a ‘functional flip’ 
from the particularity of the first subordinate theme to the generic conventionality of the local 
cadential progression that marks the attainment of the EEC. Cadential liquidation thus cuts 
across the process of thematic actualisation, restoring S1 to its generic potentiality, while also 
precluding any straightforward equation of convention with potentiality and thematic 
particularity with actuality (see Spitzer 2008, pp. 192–3). Or, more precisely, because 
liquidation can move in two directions (away from and towards convention), this suggests 
that actualisation is not so much the exhaustion of potentiality as its realisation and fulfilment 
– what might be called the actualisation of potentiality itself. 
In K. 491 the way in which the second group takes a second glance at the first, recasting 
what was thematic as cadential, manifests itself specifically in the relation between the ideé 
fixe and the refrain cadence. All but one of the S-modules in the solo exposition (S3, which 
revisits the ideé fixe, plus the multimodular expansion at the end of S1) project <^>5 with 
increasing prominence which then falls into a highly conventional <^>5–<^>4–<^>3–<^>2–
<^>1 cadential descent at the end of the module or phrase. For instance, in S1 (Ex. 6) a 
descent from <^>5 is implicit in both the upper voice of the left-hand accompaniment and the 
melodic insistence on B<f> from bar 147, which then realises itself with the first occurrence 
of the refrain cadence at bars 155–156.9 The immediate orchestral restatement repeats this 
middleground projection, although the inner dominant pedal resurfaces only briefly in the 
second oboe (bars 158–160). In the antecedent phrase of S2, <^>5 sits atop the texture (first in 
the flutes, which are then joined by the first violins at bar 205) and in the middle (shared 
between the violas and second violins), while the melody is built from an initial stepwise 
ascent from <^>3 to <^>5 (Ex. 8), which is then repeated locally (bars 208–209 and, in the 
consequent phrase, bars 218–219) immediately before the familiar linear descent at each of 
the cadences. (Arguably the melodic ascent begins from <^>1 with the prefix to S2 in bar 200, 
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which is picked up in bars 206–209 and 216–219, but the first two steps are omitted in the 
consequent phrase, and comparison with other S-modules suggests a precedent for beginning 
on <^>3.) The display episode begins at bar 241 (Ex. 9) with <^>5 in the piano’s inner voice, 
which then bubbles up to the surface (the violins in bars 245–247 and then, moving on to S5, 
the flutes, and picked out in the top of the right hand of the piano). In bar 241 the piano 
begins a middleground descent from <^>5, getting stuck on a <^>3–<^>4 alternation before 
launching in bars 2473–249 into a full-blown Cudworth cadence, with its distinctive descent 
from <^>8 (see Gjerdingen 2007, pp. 146–9), while the violins take over the familiar descent 
from <^>5 to the tonic, which the piano then assumes in the evaded cadence in S5 (bars 255–
257). 
 
[INSERT EXS 8 AND 9 NEARBY] 
 
S3, with its turn to E<f> minor, functions like a key to a puzzle, revealing by virtue of 
its juxtaposition the origin of the refrain cadence in the ideé fixe (much as the beginning of the 
development in turn reveals the affinity between R1:\P and S1:\P). After an initial 
arpeggiation through <^>1–<^>3–<^>6 (see again Ex. 1), this motto-theme is structured by a 
chromatic linear descent which dissolves into the cadential descent to the tonic: just as P 
reaches <^>2 in bar 8, the first oboe (which is a frequent vehicle for these linear progressions) 
brings the stepwise descent from <^>6 into the foreground and forges its connection to the 
cadential formula. When the ideé fixe returns from bar 220, its linear descent now sounds like 
a minor-mode echo of the refrain-cadence descent which immediately precedes it: careful 
inspection shows that the upper-neighbour inflection, though absent here, had been present in 
S1 (bars 153–154 in the piano melody and bars 162–163 in the first clarinet and bassoon) and 
will return on the downbeat of the soloist’s Cudworth cadence and in the orchestral voicing of 
S5’s evaded cadence. In S3 the cadential descent from <^>5 comes out of a longer chromatic 
descent which spans the entire module. This descent emanates from the upper voice of the 
ideé fixe’s compound melody and emerges at the top of the texture to form an extended 
counterpoint to its structurally anchoring lower-voice chromatic descent, which moves into an 
inner voice as it continues throughout S3, hesitating on an alternative between F<s> and E<s> 
during the enharmonically respelled prolongation of iii/III before resuming its descent from 
bar 234. The piano’s middleground descent in S4 is then heard to come directly out of the 
cadence at the end of S3, which, in a slight modification of its earlier incarnations and a direct 
reference to the cadence in bars 11–12, briefly redoubles the movement from <^>4 to <^>3 
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(replicated by the piano in bars 244–245 and 246–247). This version of the cadence also 
establishes a connection with R1:\S, which is omitted from the solo exposition but substitutes 
for S3, S4 and the first part of S5 in the recapitulation – that is, for each of the modules whose 
closing cadential formula includes the <^>6 prominent in the ideé fixe. 
Over the course of this process of transforming the ideé fixe into the refrain cadence, the 
melodic descent itself transmutes from the thematic to the cadential, from particular to 
convention. What was the backbone and part of the distinctive identity of the ideé fixe 
transmutes into a common or garden (<^>6–)<^>5–<^>4–<^>3–<^>2–<^>1 cadential 
descent. In one sense, this is a projection of the liquidation process that takes place within 
R1:\P itself, but there is a decisive difference. In Caplin’s Schoenbergian analysis of the 
classic sentence which opens the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata Op. 2 No. 1, 
the arpeggiation (1998, p. 11), which is initially a distinctive component of this particular 
basic idea, is whittled down to acciaccaturas and then into the spread chord at the head of the 
conventional cadential formula which descends, as in K. 491, from <^>5. As Caplin observes, 
in itself the cadence is perfectly conventional, but in context it ‘grows naturally out of the 
preceding measures’ (p. 11). Spitzer accordingly argues that ‘Beethoven perpetuates the 
illusion that the end of the phrase is both conventional and thematic’ (p. 192), which is 
thoroughly in keeping with the Schoenbergian dual notion of liquidation as at once 
‘eliminating’ and ‘condensing’ the characteristic content (1967, p. 59). 
What appears in this emergence of convention out of thematic material is a generic 
potentiality for conventional patterns to be actualised as particular thematic details. This 
thematic liquidation thus marks the passage between Guillaume’s second and third time 
images, between mood and tense, between an actual possibility and its realisation in particular 
use. Guillaume’s model thinks a process of actualisation prior to this which takes place within 
temps impliqué (aspect) or within potentiality itself. Spitzer’s position is that ‘the realisation 
of this cadential “prototype” concludes a pathway from an abstract to a concrete category’ 
(2008, p. 209). If thematic liquidation is the realisation of conventional schemata embedded 
in P as particular thematic detail in S1, cadential liquidation is likewise a movement from 
generic to particular, which, I suggest, takes place not in the interval between convention and 
theme, but within convention itself. Spitzer sees the second group in terms of a centre-
periphery schema (pp. 224–5): prototypes are categories which approximate most closely our 
engagement with concrete reality, as opposed to higher- or lower-level categories which are 
either too general or too specific. Cadential liquidation thus spans a spectrum of genericity in 
which the prototypical cadential descent represents an optimum recognisability as cadential 
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closure coming into focus between a middleground harmonic progression that is too generic 
to be heard as a cadence and a motivic detail that is insufficiently generic and has already 
passed over into thematic particularity. The second subject forms the hinge in a two-
dimensional process of actualisation, much like Guillaume’s mood: in relation to the primary 
theme, it is an actualisation of convention’s generic potentiality, while, in relation to the 
cadential theme(s), it is itself an even more generic potentiality for conventionality to realise 
itself as actual conventions, as prototypes. If thematic liquidation is the actualisation of 
generic convention as particularity, cadential liquidation is something like the actualisation 
of convention itself. 
This idea that there is not simply a realisation of convention-as-potential as actual 
instances of thematic particularity, but also, before this, a movement from potential to actual 
within convention itself addresses a possible objection that the refrain cadences are simply too 
generic to be heard as repetitions of an earlier moment within that particular piece because 
they represent a basic default option in triple metre. This question is important because the 
capacity to reopen the EEC hinges on going back in time to an earlier moment to ‘recapture’ 
it (Hepokoski and Darcy 2006, p. 150). A comparison of the first movements of K. 413 and 
K. 491 illustrates this difficulty: both make use for their refrain cadences of a typical triple-
metre formula that Robert Gjerdingen identifies as a generic galant cadence (1988, pp. 34–5). 
It is worth noting the degree of abstraction that Hepokoski and Darcy themselves tolerate. 
They include a cadence in K. 413 (bars 44–45) that lacks the first beat, with its distinctive 
dotted rhythm common to the other repetitions, and retains only a very generic melodic 
descent from <^>3 over a V–I progression, with the ubiquitous octave leap in the bass (2006, 
p. 158). But they exclude an instance in the first movement of K. 466 (bars 42–44) where the 
same bassline but different melodic construction and harmonic rhythm (cf. bars 51–53 and 
56–58) is insufficient (p. 492). Although they make no reference to Gjerdingen’s earlier work 
in schema theory, the line that Hepokoski and Darcy draw here is in keeping with his idea that 
galant schemata – cadential clausulae in particular – are a ‘co-articulation’ or ‘pas de deux of 
bass and melody’ (2006, p. 141). But, while conceding that what is needed to constitute a 
refrain is open to debate, Hepokoski and Darcy tend to think in terms of similarity between 
repetitions within a movement rather than the degree of abstraction across all instances, and 
hence the degree of external similarity with other pieces (p. 492). 
Can a schema, then, constitute a refrain and specifically in the Deleuzian sense I rely on 
here? Deleuze and Guattari think of the refrain as territorialising in so far as it produces a 
sense of ‘home’ (2004, p. 312). At first blush, this suggests that the refrain points to what is 
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proper, and hence we might expect it to involve the repetition of a particularly distinctive 
musical fragment by which a piece might be identified. Their primary examples of birdsong 
(p. 312) and of Swann’s appropriation of Vinteuil’s little phrase in À la recherché du temps 
perdu (p. 319) might advocate this reading. With their rather dilettantish musical interests, 
Deleuze and Guattari tend to cite examples which reference birdsong (the end of Das Lied 
von der Erde) or which expressly recreate worldly refrains (Wozzeck) (p. 339). Only two 
examples have music-theoretical ramifications that impact on the analysis here: Schumann’s 
Cello Concerto, where the soloist’s emancipation from the orchestra is at stake (p. 297), and, 
more significant, the Mozart theme, mentioned earlier, which is subject to variation (p. 331). 
This last suggests that the refrain operates at a certain level of abstraction subtracted from the 
particular surface actuality, operating more like a generic template capable of being repeated 
– actualised – in a series of particular uses or concrete instances. This notion is completely in 
keeping with Hepokoski and Darcy’s use of the term ‘refrain cadence’ to refer to the 
repetition of a ‘stock’ formula (2006, p. 158) or ‘stamp’ (p. 492). With greater rigour, 
Spitzer’s prototype and Gjerdingen’s schema identify an optimal point of recognisability on a 
spectrum between particular and generic, poised between a very specific nexus of voice-
leading, rhythmic and textural components too detailed to recall and a general principle of 
tonality that still lacks the functional specificity to reflect the level at which listeners engage 
with music. Cadential liquidation can then be thought of as the actualisation of a specific 
schema out of the virtual reservoir of tonal resources. 
Understanding cadential liquidation in this way slides the division between convention 
and particular in the direction of convention, making a caesura within convention itself. Just 
as the opposition of particular to convention maps onto that of actual to virtual, cadential 
liquidation inscribes a separation between actual convention and its possibility – that is, 
between actual convention realised as prototype and potential convention which may or may 
not be realised as prototype. To think the refrain as temps impliqué is precisely to perform this 
operation: to slide the refrain in the direction of the virtual so as to deterritorialise it. The 
notion of temps impliqué inscribes the caesura between potentiality and actuality within 
potentiality itself between potentiality and its own possibility. 
In a provocative reading of a problematic mention of potentiality (dunamis) in the 
Aristotelian corpus, Agamben argues that actuality is not the necessary end of potentiality, 
because impotentiality belongs to every potentiality (2005a, pp. 284–5). Aristotle states that 
‘a thing is said to be potential [dunaton] if, when the act of which it is said to be potential is 
realized, there will be nothing impotential [adunaton]’ (1933, s. 1047a, pp. 24–6). While this 
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sentence is usually read as the tautology ‘what is possible is what is not impossible’, 
Agamben insists that adunaton be read not as a modal negation, whereby ‘can be’ inverts into 
‘cannot be’, but as a privative negation: the potential not to (‘can not be’). All genuine 
potentiality is impotentiality in so far as it can not be at the same time it can be; were it not to 
retain this contingency, potentiality would automatically turn into actuality at some point. 
The Deleuzian refrain (which, we may recall, is temps impliqué) thus distinguishes 
between a possible possibility which may or may not take place and a fully formed possibility 
which is simply awaiting realisation. It is this opposition between a possibility-in-waiting and 
genuine potentiality-as-contingency that Guillaume marks out when he distinguishes between 
the formation of aspect and mood as two separate chronotheses. In the subjunctive mood 
(which corresponds to the formation of mood), there is only a possibility of taking place at 
some indeterminate future point. The first time image, constituted by temps impliqué, retains 
at the same time the possibility of not taking place. Agamben argues that the passage from 
potentiality to actuality does not consist in the exhaustion of impotentiality. Focusing on the 
constitution of potentiality itself through temps impliqué provides an alternative to the 
trajectory of temporal actualisation suggested by the chronogenesis as a whole. This proceeds 
from impotentiality through potentiality to actuality, as temps impliqué is subordinated first to 
universe time and then to temps expliqué. The local actualisation of temps impliqué itself, 
however, offers a different model of the passage from potentiality to actuality. The concept of 
temps impliqué requires thinking potentiality as a relation to itself. In this way, it substitutes 
privative for modal negation: it is not that impotentiality’s ‘can not be’ is inverted into the 
‘cannot not be’ of necessity, but instead actuality becomes what ‘can not not be’. 
If temps impliqué determines the location of a possibility on a spectrum from potential 
to actual, the refrain then becomes a measure not of the extent to which an existing possibility 
in musical material is realised in actuality, but of the degree to which this possibility is itself 
formed. It is precisely in conventional material’s manifestation as a refrain – in its 
reappearance under the Nietzschean test of repetition – that it reveals the extent of its own 
consistency and actualisation. Whereas thematic development gauges the progress of the 
exposition’s first liquidation, the refrain is an index of the degree of cadential liquidation. The 
refrain measures the extent to which convention (as generic tonality) is realised not as 
(motivic) particularity, but as (cadential) prototype.  
On this model, the refrain cadences do not so much coincide with as sit perpendicular to 
or athwart the process of cadential liquidation. At first blush K. 491 seems to resemble closely 
Spitzer’s example of the first movement of the ‘Jupiter’ Symphony (K. 551), where the 
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cadential descent in the second subject also emerges from a middleground prolongation of 
<^>5. But in what sense can one speak of ‘focalisation’, ‘stripping away’ and ‘unmasking’ 
(Spitzer 2008, p. 199) when the prototype recurs so prominently throughout the second group 
as a refrain cadence? K. 551 proceeds through more varied incarnations of the descent from 
<^>5, the figure continuing to bubble up all the way into C-space until it appears as a residual 
motivic figure. In neither movement is the EEC itself attained by the melodic descent from 
<^>5; rather, it is attained by way of the simpler Mi–Re–Do schema (Gjerdingen 2007, pp. 
142–5), suggesting that cadential liquidation does not in fact coincide with expositional 
closure. This assumes that the EEC in K. 551 comes at bars 110–111. Hepokoski and Darcy 
merely cite this S-space, immediately after their discussion of refrain cadences, as a ‘related 
situation […] of unusual revisitings of seeming S-material’ whose dialogic complexity is to 
be savoured more than solved (2006, p. 159), but an analysis may be reconstructed: if the first 
PAC at bars 70–71 is reopened by the repetition of earlier P material leading to a postmedial 
caesura-effect at bars 78–79 before the C minor episode, then the PACs at bars 88–89 and 93–
94 are reopened by the immediate repetition of what is now deemed S-material; the new 
theme at 101 continues the deferral with a threefold repetition of its PAC. 
In K. 491 it is the refrain cadence that acts as a counterforce against the will-to-closure 
embodied in the rhyming Mi–Re–Do trill cadences preceded by Do–Re–Mi opening gambits. 
Caplin argues that expositional closure typically warrants an expanded cadential progression 
(1987, p. 216), and this is precisely what distinguishes the movement’s trio of trill-cadences 
from the more abbreviated refrain schema. In the first trill cadence, the harmonic rhythm 
slows from the refrain cadence’s one harmonic function per crotchet beat to one per bar (bars 
196–200). The second trill cadence halves this to one every two bars (bars 257–265), while in 
the recapitulation the progression is lengthened further through the expansion of the pre-
dominant function with an inserted chromatic passing note in the bass supporting vii7/V. K. 
413 similarly distinguishes its trill cadence in the solo exposition from the refrain cadences, 
again with the Do–Re–Mi opening followed by an expanded Mi–Re–Do cadential 
progression. The argument over the location of the EEC admits of yet another solution: seeing 
the chain of refrain cadences as a process of actualisation sitting alongside and interacting 
with, but not reducible to, the realisation of expositional closure allows for an alternative 
interpretation of movements such as this, where a sonata-theory reading suggests a massive 
expansion of S-space, in this case into the second tutti. In K. 491 it also opens up another 
dimension in which the drama between individual and collective may be played out. 
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The refrain cadences – conventionalised traces of the ideé fixe which stubbornly persist 
in the face of closure’s actualisation – might then be described as a ‘residue’ of the cadential 
liquidation process, recalling Schoenberg’s use of the term to describe what is left of musical 
material once it is stripped of its particularity (1967, p. 59). These residual cadences persist 
across the solo exposition’s second group, refusing to dissolve into the process of expositional 
closure. Agamben argues that what is to be affirmed in the eternal return is contingency as 
such: the possibility as a whole that something will or will not take place (1986, pp. 9–17). 
This explains Nietzsche’s amor fati: what returns eternally is the repetition of impotentiality 
in all actuality. Similarly, what the refrain cadences bring back with each repetition – with 
every instance of the prototype – is the possibility that the convention may or may not realise 
its functional potential as the endpoint of expositional closure. Recall Caplin’s adage that not 
every cadential formula functions as cadential closure (2004, pp. 81–5). That is why it is 
possible to reopen a previous PAC through the repetition of a refrain cadence. If a schema is 
not reducible to the combination of outer voices, but also includes the fulfilment of a 
particular function (Gjerdingen 1988, p. 37), what comes back in the refrain cadence is the 
potentiality for a particular nexus of melody, bass and harmonic progression to realise itself as 
a cadential function capable of bringing about closure – or, put otherwise, the potentiality for 
closure to effect itself in the guise of a particular formula. What returns, then, in the eternal 
return of the refrain cadence is the very possibility of cadencing like that.  
Schoenberg thinks of liquidation as a process which, in moving towards a conventional 
cadential formula, eliminates all but those features (the conventional ones) ‘which no longer 
demand a continuation’ (1967, p. 58) The idea, as Jonathan Kramer explains, is that 
‘convention rather than contextual references […] avoids any implications toward the piece’s 
future which would work against coming to a close’ (1982, p. 4). The capacity to close, then, 
derives from the exhaustion of thematic potentiality. The refrain cadence is arguably therefore 
in a different category from the recaptures of thematic portions of S via which the concept is 
introduced (Hepokoski and Darcy 2006, p. 158). If the former retrospectively defers the EEC 
by prolonging the potentiality proper to thematic particularity, the later revisits convention in 
its impotentiality, returning each previous sounding of the formula to its functional 
contingency. The refrain cadence reopens the EEC less because it recaptures a particular 
melodic-harmonic configuration from earlier in the movement than because it returns to a 
particular state of actualisation already reached. This is why the refrain cadence can be of a 
very generic type and may be recaptured over lengthy time spans without attenuating the 
reopening effect: it does not depend upon the listener’s recalling the specific surface details of 
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an earlier cadence, but involves returning to a degree of actualisation at which the stock 
pattern may or may not fully realise itself as a cadential schema capable of effecting 
expositional closure. The initial quick succession of refrain cadences in K. 413 begets a long-
delayed recapture because the proximity leads to a disproportionate sense of thematic 
particularity (of the cadence belonging to the particular theme) which tends to militate against 
closure. K. 491 may be distinguished by the variety of thematic material which the refrain 
cadence is used to close; this tends to push the cadence in the direction of generic convention 
and reduces expectations of later reopening. Coupled with the significant reordering and 
omission in the recapitulation, this goes towards the impression in this movement of the 
soloist being at the arbitrary mercy of fate. 
The concept of impotentiality brings us back to the question of the second group’s 
temporal disposition. Spitzer’s notion of cadential emergence does not share the same 
backward-looking connotations as Hepokoski and Darcy’s conception of EEC deferral, but 
instead entails a sense of ‘vertiginous intensity’ stemming from liquidation’s compression of 
a larger time span into a small-scale motivic detail. Traditionally, theories of possibility have 
likewise strictly prohibited past contingency: once an event is over, there is no looking back. 
Against the headlong actualisation of horizontal thematic liquidation and vertical cadential 
emergence, I propose to hear in the repetition of the refrain cadence a more leisurely diagonal. 
This depends on the distinctive temporality of PAC reopenings: understood in its full force, 
Hepokoski and Darcy’s theory violates the ban on past contingency by suggesting that the 
past can still be otherwise than it was. The mere repetition of a cadential pattern undoes the 
presumption in favour of its functional efficacy. PAC reopenings thus restore impotentiality 
to the past: what was may now not have been. 
This reading produces a provocative reversal: Hepokoski and Darcy, supposedly 
thinkers of teleology and completion, become, against Caplin’s and Spitzer’s models of 
actualisation, the defenders of impotentiality and of the virtual. This conclusion also suggests 
a rider to Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the refrain: if the refrain is temps impliqué, then 
music as deterritorialisation is not something other than the refrain, but simply its eternal 
return. This is the logic played out in the first movement of Mozart’s K. 491: while the 
repetition of the opening ritornello’s ideé fixe threatens fate as the ultimate inevitability, the 
solo exposition embraces a Nietzschean amor fati as an affirmation of contingency. 
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NOTES 
1. Although there has been some debate over whether K. 491 is less theatrical than K. 466, 
many commentators have noted its dark tone and the high degree of intensity in the 
interaction between orchestra and soloist. See especially Keefe (2001), who suggests that 
the unprecedented symmetrical organisation of its dialogical aspects may even be the 
motivation for the deferral of expositional closure, while Kerman hears in the 
development’s duel ‘a rare example of a real struggle’ between ‘aggressive’ orchestra and 
‘horrified’ soloist (1994, pp. 163). 
2. Deleuze saw the fundamental lesson of Guillaume’s work as substituting a differential 
position for Saussure’s relation of opposition. Deleuze also spoke highly of Guillaume in 
his Paris-VIII classes on cinema (19 and 26 March 1985), Bibliothèque nationale 
archives. 
3. I follow here Derrida’s well-known critique of (self-)presence (2011). To forge this 
connection between present and self-presence, Derrida reads Husserl’s analysis of the 
‘living present’ experienced in hearing oneself speak (p. 67): in so far as I hear myself 
speak immediately in the very moment that I am speaking, I am present to myself without 
any temporal dislocation, such that self-presence occurs in the pure present of the now. 
One of the consequences of the critique of self-presence is Derrida’s attributing to the 
text what might be described as ‘agency’, a tendency seen more widely in Continental 
thought, including in Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the musical refrain. 
Accordingly, in this article I see music and listening as mutually constitutive, such that 
when the activity of listening recalls an earlier cadence in hearing a later one, this 
listening activity is heard as an effect promoted by a musical style which already 
anticipates and depends upon its interaction with a listener: it is in this sense that the 
music can be said to return to itself, for example. 
4. I discuss the distinction Caplin makes between cadential arrival and cadential function in 
greater detail below, alongside his concerns about the projection of local cadential 
function onto higher structural levels. See Caplin (2004), pp. 77–81. 
5. See Caplin, Hepokoski and Webster (2009), pp. 31–4, where Caplin expressly concludes 
that a focus on form functionality ‘forces us to confront directly the processes that create 
musical time.’ 
6. What follows is a step towards a task that Caplin himself postpones until further study: ‘a 
detailed investigation of how loosening devices can be distributed in a group of 
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subordinate themes and the nature of the ensuring overall form exceeds the bounds of this 
study’ (1998, p. 273 n. 76). 
7. The piece cited is Mozart’s Twelve Variations on ‘Ah vous dirai-je, Maman’, K. 265. It 
is not clear why Deleuze and Guattari select this example, except that the theme’s 
repeated notes introduce an unusual degree of repetition at the most local level within the 
theme. It is also unclear from their observation that the theme is ‘internally doubled’ 
whether they recognise the rounded binary construction as normative. I return later to 
why we might read an emphasis on variation procedure in this reference to Mozart. 
8. Mozart’s love of variation-type procedures has long been noted in the literature. See, for 
example, Ivanovitch (2008) and (2010), as well as Agawu (1996); for a comparison of 
Mozart’s and Haydn’s respective approaches to variation, see Sisman (1993), pp. 196–
234. 
9. The <f><^>6–<^>5 neighbour is a staple of tonal music, often operating in counterpoint 
with the chromatic passing-note motion through <s><^>4 so typical of cadential bass 
lines. There are myriad examples from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
of pieces that elevate this local voice-leading motion to the level of global structure, often 
via the augmented sixth, which <f><^>6 supports. The A<f>–G dyad returns throughout 
the concerto, especially in the finale, where it is also recast as a Neapolitan inflection. 
  
30 
 
REFERENCES 
Agamben, Giorgio, 1986: ‘The Eternal Return and the Paradox of Passion’, Stanford Italian 
Review, 6/i–ii (1986), pp. 9–17. 
______, 2005a: La potenza del pensiero: saggi e conferenze (Vicenza: Neri Pozza). 
______, 2005b: The Time That Remains: a Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. 
Patricia Dailey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Originally published as Il 
tempo che resta: un commento alla Lettera ai Romani (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 
2000). 
Agawu, V. Kofi, 1996: ‘Mozart’s Art of Variation: Remarks on the First Movement of K. 
503’, in Neal Zaslaw (ed.), Mozart’s Piano Concertos: Text, Context, Interpretation, 
ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 239–60.  
Aristotle, 1933: The Metaphysics, Books I–IX, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical 
Library 271 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Caplin, William E., 1987: ‘The “Expanded Cadential Progression”: a Category for the 
Analysis of Classical Form’, Journal of Musicological Research, 7/ii–iii, pp. 215–57. 
______, 1998: Classical Form: a Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of 
Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 
______, 2004: ‘The Classical Cadence: Conceptions and Misconceptions’, Journal of the 
American Musicological Society, 57/i, pp. 51–117. 
Caplin, William E.; Hepokoski, James; and Webster, James, 2009: Musical Form, Forms and 
Formenlehre: Three Methodological Reflections, ed. Pieter Bergé (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press). 
Deleuze, Gilles, 1983: Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone 
Press). Originally published as Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1962). 
______, 1991. Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone 
Books). Originally published as Le Bergsonisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1966). 
______, 2004: Difference and Repetition, trans. Brian Massumi (New York: Continuum). 
Originally published as Différence et répétition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1968). 
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, 2004: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (New York: Continuum). Originally published 
as Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2: Mille plateaux (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1980). 
31 
 
Derrida, Jacques, 1988: The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, 
trans. Peggy Kamuf (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press). Originally published as 
L’oreille de l’autre (otobiographies, transferts, traductions): textes et débats avec 
Jacques Derrida, sous la direction de Claude Lévesque et Christie V. McDonald 
(Montreal: VLB éditeur, 1982). 
______, 2011: Voice and Phenomena, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press). Originally published as La Voix et le phénomène (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1967). 
Gallope, Michael, 2010: ‘The Sound of Repeating Life: Ethics and Metaphysics in Deleuze’s 
Philosophy of Music’, in Hulse and Nesbitt, Sounding the Virtual, pp. 77–102. 
Gjerdingen, Robert O., 1988: A Classic Turn of Phrase: Music and the Psychology of 
Convention (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). 
______, 2007: Music in the Galant Style (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 
Guillaume, Gustave, 1929: Temps et verbe: théorie des aspects, des modes et des temps 
(Paris: Éditions Champion). 
Hallward, Peter, 2006: Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (London: 
Verso). 
Hepokoski, James and Darcy, Warren, 2006: Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and 
Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
Hirtle, Walter, 2007: Language in the Mind: an Introduction to Guillaume’s Theory 
(Montreal: McGill–Queens University Press). 
Hulse, Brian, 2010: ‘Thinking Musical Difference: Music Theory as Minor Science’, in Hulse 
and Nesbitt, Sounding the Virtual, pp. 23–50. 
Hulse, Brian and Nesbitt, Nick (eds), 2010: Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the 
Theory and Philosophy of Music (Farnham: Ashgate). 
Ivanovitch, Roman, 2008: ‘Showing Off: Variation in the Display Episodes of Mozart’s Piano 
Concertos’, Journal of Music Theory, 52/ii, pp. 181–218. 
______, 2010: ‘Recursive/Discursive: Variation and Sonata in the Andante of Mozart’s String 
Quartet in F, K. 590’, Music Theory Spectrum, 32/ii, pp. 145–64. 
Keefe, Simon P., 2001: Mozart’s Piano Concertos: Dramatic Dialogue in the Age of 
Enlightenment (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press). 
Kerman, Joseph, 1994: ‘Mozart’s Piano Concertos and their Audience’, in James M. Morris 
(ed.), On Mozart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
32 
 
Kramer, Jonathan D., 1982: ‘Beginnings and Endings in Western Art Music’, Canadian 
University Music Review, 3, pp. 1–14. 
Malabou, Catherine, 2010: ‘The Eternal Return and the Phantom of Difference’, Parrhesia, 
10, pp. 21–9. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, [1908] 1990: Ecce Homo, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage). 
Schoenberg, Arnold, 1967: Fundamentals of Musical Composition, ed. Gerald Strang and 
Leonard Stein (London: Faber & Faber). 
Sisman, Elaine, 1993: Haydn and the Classical Variation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press). 
Spitzer, Michael, 2004: Music and Metaphorical Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press). 
______, 2007: ‘Sonata Dialogues’ [review of Hepokoski and Darcy 2006], Beethoven Forum, 
14/i, pp. 150–78. 
______, 2008: ‘A Metaphoric Model of Sonata Form: Two Expositions by Mozart’, in Danuta 
Mirka and Kofi Agawu (eds), Communication in Eighteenth-Century Music 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 189–229. 
 
  
33 
 
NOTE ON CONTRIBUTOR 
NAOMI WALTHAM-SMITH is Assistant Professor of Music at the University of Pennsylvania. 
Her research sits at the intersection of music theory, sound studies and contemporary 
European philosophy, and she has published in journals from Music Theory Spectrum to 
boundary 2. Her book Music and Belonging between Revolution and Restoration was 
published by Oxford University Press in July 2017, and she is currently writing a second 
book, The Sound of Biopolitics, for a political philosophy series. 
  
34 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article proposes an alternative way to think about the process of expositional closure. The 
recent resurgence of Formenlehre has given rise to a dispute about the correlation between 
expositional closure and the sequence of local perfect authentic cadences in the second group. 
Noting that the two sides of the debate produce opposing representations of the temporality of 
listening, I draw upon philosophical and linguistic models of actualisation to theorise the way 
in which expositional closure is realised across the second group. To this end, I focus on the 
refrain cadences in the first movement of Mozart’s Piano Concerto in C minor K. 491 which, 
as a means of deferring expositional closure, sit uneasily alongside other strategies of thematic 
loosening and cadential liquidation. The idea of the refrain leads me to Gilles Deleuze’s theory 
of repetition and from there, via the notion of temps impliqué, to Gustave Guillaume’s system 
of verb formation—both of which problematise the passage from potentiality to actuality, 
isolating a dimension of contingency as that which may or may not come to pass. 
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Ex. 1 Mozart, Piano Concerto in C minor, K. 491/i, bars 1–13 
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Ex. 2 K. 491/i, bars 35–44 
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Ex. 3 K. 491/i, bars 118–129 
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˙˙˙˙ ™™™™ ˙˙˙˙ ™™™™ ˙˙˙ œœœ
˙˙˙
™™
™ ˙˙˙nn ™™™ œœœbbb œÆ Œ
˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™
™ ˙˙ œœ œœ'
##
œœ
Æ
‰™
œœ#R
œœ œœ œœnn œœ
Æ
nn œ
Æ
Œ
œ œ œ œ
œ
‰™ œr œ œ œn œn
œb
‰™ œb r œ œ œ œ
œ
‰™ œb r
Œ Œ œœ Œ Œ œœœb Œ Œ œœ
˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™ ˙˙bn ™™ ˙˙ ™™ ˙ ™˙ œb
˙ ™ œ˙
™
Œ Œ ˙ ™ œ˙ ™ Œ Œ ˙ ™
˙ œb
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Ex. 4 K. 491/i, bars 220–227 
 
  
{
{
{
{
{
{
220
224
226
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
≈œœœœœœœœœœœ ≈ œb œœ
œb œœœœœœœ ≈ œb œ œb
œb œœœœœœœ ≈ œn œn œ œb œn
œn œ œ œœœ
˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™
‰˙ ™ œJ œ œ œ œ ‰
˙b ™ œbJ œ œ œ œ ‰
˙b œbJ
œ œÆn œ
Æb
‰™ œbRœ œ œ œ
œ‰ Œœ
œj
Œ œœ
œ œœ œœ œœ ‰ Œ
œœj
Œ œ
œœ œœ œœ œœ ‰
Œ
œœb j
Œ œ
œœ œœ œœb œœ ‰
Œ
œœœnb
j
Œ
œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ
≈ œb œ
œb
≈ œ œ œ ≈ œb œ œb ≈ œ œ œb œb œ
œ œb œ œ œ œ
œœ œœ œœ ˙˙bb ™
™
‰
œb œbJ
œ œb œÆ œÆn ‰™ œRœ œ œb œ
œ‰ Œ
œœb
j
Œ œb
œœ œœb œœb œœ ‰
Œ
œœœnn
j
Œ
œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ
≈ œn œ# œn ≈ œ# œ œ# ≈ œ# œ œ# ≈ œ# œ# œn œn œ#
œ# œn œ œ œ œ
œœ œœ œœ ˙˙nn ™
™
‰
œn œnJ
œ# œ# œÆ# œ
Æn
‰™ œRœ# œ œ œ
œ‰ Œœ
œ##
j
Œ œnœ
œ# œœ œœn œœ ‰ Œœ
œœ#n#
j
Œœ
œœ œœœ œœœ œœœ
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Ex. 5 K. 491/i, S1:\S refrain cadences 
 
  
{ { {
{ { {
155 164 219
240 248 256
&bbb &bbb nb &b
bb
?bbb ?bbb ?bbb
&bbb &bbb
Ÿ
&bbb
?bbb ?bbb ?bbb
‰ œJ œœ œœ œœ œœ œ
œjœJ
œœ œœ œœœœ œœ œœ œ
œœœ œœœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œ
œœ œ œ œ œ œ ‰ œœ
œœ œœ œ
œœ œœ
œœ œœ
œœ œœ œœœœ
œœœœ
œœœ
œœœœ
œœœœ œ
œœœ œ
œœœ œ
œ ‰™ œœR œœœ
œrœ œ œ œ
œœœ
œ œ œ œ
œœœ
œ
œœ
œ œœœ œ œœœ ™™ œœ œœ œœœ œ
œ
œœ
œ
œœ
œ
œœ
œ œœœ
œœœ
œ œœ
œœ œœ œ
œ œœ
œ
œœ
œœ
œ ™ œ ˙
œœ œœ
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Fig. 1 Correspondence bars in Mozart’s K. 491/i 
 
 
 
 
  
S-module Bars in exposition Correspondence bars in 
recapitulation 
Preceding CF 
R1:\S 
35–44 
44–63 
435–444 
444–463 (now in S3)* 
S1:\S1 
Solo statement 
Orchestral restatement 
Expansion 
147–200 
147–156* 
156–165* 
165–200 (multimodular expansion 
culminating in first trill cadence) 
410–435 (now S3:\TM2) 
410–419* 
419–428* 
428–435 (shortened and reworked to form 
second MC-effect) 
S1:\S2 201–220* 391–410 (now S3:\TM1)* 
S1:\S3 220–241* - 
S1:\S4 241–249* - 
S1:\S5 
Non-thematic module 
Expansion leading into: 
Final trill-cadence (EEC) 
249–265 
249–257* 
257– 
261–265 
463–473 (brief allusion to S1) 
- 
463– (reworked) 
469–473 
* ends with refrain cadence 
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Ex. 6 K. 491/i, bars 147–156 
 
 
  
{
{
{
{
147
152
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
˙ ™ ˙ ™
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb ∑ ∑
?bbb ∑
œ Œ Œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ Œ Œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ Œ Œ
œ œ œœ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œœœ œ œœ œ œœ œ œ œ œœ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œœœ œ œœ œ œœ œ œ œ œœ œ œ œ œ œ
˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™ œœ œœ œœ ˙˙ ™™ œœ œœ œœ
˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™ œœ˙ ™ œœ œœ ˙˙ ™™ œœ˙ ™ œœ œœ
œ œb œ œ œ œn œ. œ. œ ‰ œnJ œ
. œ.n œ ‰ œbJ œœ œœ œœ œœ œ
œ œ œœ œ œ œ œ œb œ œ œœ œ œ œ œ œb œ œ œœ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™ ˙˙ ™™
˙ ™˙ ™ œ˙ ™ ˙ œ˙ ™ ˙ œ
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Ex. 7 K. 491/i, bars 257–265 
 
 
  
{
{
{
{
{
{
25 7
260
263
&bbb
?bbb
?bbb
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb ∑ &
?bbb &
?bbb
&bbb
Ÿ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
&bbb
&bbb
?bbb
cresc.
≈ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ œ œ œ œ œb œ œ œ œ œ œ œb œ œ œ œ œ œ œb œ œ œ œ
œ œ œb
œ Œ Œ œ Œ Œ
œ Œ Œ
˙ ™Œ œœœ œœœ ˙ ™Œ œœœb œœœ ˙ ™Œ œœœ œœœ
œ Œ Œ œ Œ Œ œ Œ Œ
œ œ œ œn œ œ œ œ œ œ œn œ œ œn œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ Œ Œ œ Œ Œ
˙ ™Œ œœ
œ œœœ ‰ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ œœœ
œ Œ Œ œœ Œ
œ Œœ
œœ œ œ
˙ ™ œ œ ˙ ™ œ
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œœ
œœ œ œœ œ œœ œ œœ œ œœ œ œœ œ œœœ œ œœœ œ œœœ œ œœœ œ œœœ œ œœœ œ œœ
œœ
œ˙
™ Œ Œ œ˙
™ Œ Œ
œœœ
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Fig. 2 Guillaume’s system of the verb 
 
 
  
! go 
∞!∞!∞!
∞!∞!∞!
chronogenesis 
past non-past 
gone 
going 
goes went 
he go 
quasi-nominal mood 
subjunctive mood 
indicative mood 
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Ex. 8 K. 491/i, bars 211–214 
 
 
  
{
{
211
&bbb
3 3 3 3
?bbb ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
&bbb
?bbb
˙ œr œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
˙˙ œœ
œœ œœ œœ
œœ œœ œœ œ
œ
œœ œœ
œœ œ œ œ
œ œ œ
Œ
œ
Œœ œœ Œ
œ
Œœ œ˙ Œ Œœ
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Ex. 9 K. 491/i, bars 241–257 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
{
{
{
{
{
{
{
241
245
249
253
&bbb
?bbb &
&bbb
Ÿ
&bbb ?
&bbb
?bbb ∑ ∑ ∑
&bbb
?bbb
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
3 3
3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3
3 3
&bbb
?bbb
&bbb h ≈
?bbb
&bbb
?bbb
œ ™ œ ˙
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ Œ œœ œœ Œ œœ œœ Œ œœ œœ Œ œœ
œ œ œn œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œn œb œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œrœ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œœ Œ œn œ Œ œ œb œ œ œ œ œ
‰ œœJ
œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ œœ Œ ‰™ œœr œœ œœ œœ
œœ œ œœ
œ Œ Œ Œ œœ œœ œœ ™™ œœ œœ Œ Œ œœ œœ
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ œ
œ
œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ
œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ œœœœ
œœ œœœœ œœœœ
œœœ œœ œœ
œœ œœœœ œœœœ
œœœ œœ œœ
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œ
œn œœ œn œœœ
œ
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J
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.
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. œ
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